(Another paper. Why? Because I felt like it!)
In order to understand St. Gregory Palamas’ ideas, it is necessary to understand and acknowledge the impact of two individuals upon his thought – to wit, that of his contemporary and theological opponent Barlaam of Calabria, as well as that of the famous neo-Platonic author of Mystical Theology and On the Divine Names; that is, Dionysius the Areopagite (referred to here as Pseudo-Dionysius because of the texts’ pseudephigraphical authorship). The prior was the originator of the issue combated by St. Palamas: Barlaam’s denial of the uncreated nature of the divine energies, akin to some Roman Catholic Scholastic theologians’ opinion of these energies as created substance given freely (Lt.: gratis data). The latter, however, was perchance the most deeply influential thinker with regard to this particular mystical-theological argument, although it is not at all any need to discriminate for this reason against the other Fathers mentioned in the Triads. In brief, it could be said that St. Gregory founded his argument against Barlaam’s strict rationalism using those “tools” provided by the Fathers, most notably the Neo-Platonic mysticism and metaphysics of Pseudo-Dionysius.
The question St. Gregory sets out to answer is: “Is only the divine essence without beginning, whereas everything apart from it is of a created nature?” – and, if so, is “this essence…all-powerful” (93)? Would this essence (ousia) “possess the faculties of knowing, of prescience, of creating, of embracing all things in itself?” Does it, in other words, “possess providence, the power of deification and, in a word, all such faculties, or not” (93)? If the answer is a clear “no,” then said essence is not “God,” nor is it “God-like.” Barlaam’s theology, hence, would fail to explain the intrinsic nature of the Godhead. But if the essence of the Godhead were in full possession of these properties “from eternity,” then not only would the essence be “unoriginate, but that each of its powers…also” (93). The sections following are devoted to addressing St. Palamas’ claim at the end of section 5: “For just as there is only one single essence without beginning, the essence of God…in the same way, there is only one single providential power without beginning, namely that of God whereas as all other powers apart from it are of a created nature…” (93). Hence, Barlaam’s proclamation of the essence as the only unoriginate aspect of God is inescapably false and unfounded. This paper shall attempt to unfold St. Palamas’ argument and understanding of the metaphysical properties of both God’s essence and energies.
Before distinguishing between the eternal essence (ousia) of God and His “energies” (energeiai, also known as “natural energies”), it is necessary to describe in detail what: a) the energies are, and b) what their relation is – if there is to be such a relation – to man and/or creation in general. In brief, the “energies” of God are considered in Orthodox theology as equivalent with God’s works/action within the temporal world as well as His grace. Nonetheless, some examples the saint offers us include God’s “foreknowledge, will, providence, contemplation of Himself,” virtue, and existence (94). There was never a time when these did not exist; on the contrary, because they are of God and are not of a created nature, they were with Him ab aeterno. In accordance with the writing of St. Maximus, St. Gregory notes that while these may have an origin in time (e.g. when these are manifested in the temporal realm through God’s works/activity, for to one established within the temporal realm would perceive a specific “beginning” to such works), they yet remain unoriginate and therefore uncreated due to their participation in the divine essence. In other words, “‘non-being is not [and cannot be] anterior to virtue…nor to any other of the realities mentioned before, since they have God as the eternal and absolutely unique originator of their being’” (95). God has thus established these powers, notes St. Palamas in reference to Pseudo-Dionysius, but the statement is only true in reference to the existence of the powers and not their mode. Like the hypostatic individuation of the Son, these powers were founded as a “hypostasis,” or, in simpler terms, as an “establishment” (102).
Yet none of these energies are, however, true descriptions of the essence (ousia) of God. As noted by St. Gregory’s oft-quoted theologian and ecclesiastical writer (i.e., Pseudo-Dionysius): “None of these things can be either identified with it or attributed unto It” (99). God transcends these energies “‘to an infinite degree and an infinite number of times’” (96; quote from St. Maximus); hence, the “superessential essence of God is…not to be identified with the energies, even with those without beginning” (96; emphasis added). Therefore, cataphatic theology (i.e., positive assertions regarding the properties of God), can speak only of the energies of God, for these are not beyond positive proclamations and can likewise be understood in this manner insofar as they are experienced and known in the Christian life. As Pseudo-Dionysius points out, to call Him “God,” “Life,” “Essence,” “Light,” or “Word” is in effect to reference these energies alone (98). Even the term “essence” identifies but one of God’s eternally-proceeding energies, making Barlaam’s statement that the “essence alone is uncreated” irrational and illogical inasmuch as this would designate the uncreated nature to but one power while systematically demystifying the others.
The “deifying powers” or grace are participatory and provide mankind with an opportunity for deification, and, hence, salvation. “Deification,” however, is not to be understood as becoming God by nature via active participation with the ousia of God, but rather according to energy. These powers also provide mankind with the opportunity to participate and experience the glory of the Transcendent One. The “rays” of the divine energies, granted, are only visible to those who are “worthy,” and, although they are, according to Tradition, potentially very palpable to His creation, they are nevertheless “distinct from all creatures in [their] transcendence” of both the intellect and the senses (100). For instance, the Transfiguration on Mount Tabor (Matthew 17:1-9, Mark 9:2-8, and Luke 9:28-36) was, for the Apostles, a vision of the divine energies, or, in St. Gregory Palamas’ words, it was “the superluminous splendor of the beauty of the Archetype [i.e. God]; the very formless form of the divine loveliness, which deifies man and makes him worthy of personal converse with God…” (106). They saw, to wit, “the same grace of the Spirit which would later dwell in them” (106). Nevertheless, the Apostles did not and could not witness the unbound and impalpable essence of God, which remained and still remains beyond all things, irrespective of one’s nearness to theosis or so-called “state of grace.” Instead, the nature of the experience marks it as a contemplation of God’s energies, since it is characterized by contemplation and, at least to a degree, visual experience (at least insofar as it can be said that the Apostles “saw” the eternal light radiating from the Word).
In contrast to Barlaam’s Alexandrian school of understanding (a school dominated by somewhat Origenistic thinkers insofar as they believed contact with the divine to be primarily experienced through intellectual activity, and not through the senses), St. Gregory – especially in his teaching on the hesychastic method of prayer – understands the “rays” or noetic “illuminations” therein as having a clearly spiritual quality. In order to outline the nature of this union, St. Gregory begins with the following analogy in section 14: “[E]very union is through contact, sensible in the realm of sense perception, intellectual in that of intellect” (100). Because there is, in fact, “union with these illuminations” – as is known from the lives of the saints and Biblical history – “there must be contact with them, of an intellectual, or rather a spiritual kind” (100; emphasis added). Perhaps, however, usage of the term “intellectual unity” would be misleading. The unity is attained in a manner distinct from the realm of intellectual and physical sensations, and, while the rays of these divine energies are indeed visible to those who are worthy, the spiritual light transcends the capacity of the intellectual and sensual faculties of any finite being – and this, because it cannot be described as possessing the attributes necessary for either of the aforesaid capacities, due to its transcendent and heavenly nature. Thus, it “is neither a sensation nor an intellection, but is a spiritual power, distinct from all created cognitive faculties in its transcendence, and made present by grace in rational natures which have been purified” (100; emphasis added).
Had these energies been creations in the strictest sense (in other words, having a definite beginning in time), they would most likely be perceptible to either the intellectual or sensual faculties of rational creatures. However, we find that this characteristic is not present (as stated in the above paragraph), for it is evident that the “rays” of the divine energies are of a spiritual nature. They may be accessible to the intellect – as our saint points out, citing St. Basil the Great – but they “transcend,” and to an infinite degree. Thus, they are unoriginate, and thereby able to describe to originated beings, as much as possible, the very nature of Him to whom they belong (and Gregory shows his Patristic brilliance here, inasmuch as this is the very cornerstone of a balanced Chalcedonian Orthodox perspective – i.e., God’s energies are incarnational; see John 1:18). Possessing a spiritual nature, it is necessary for beings to rely on the precedence of existence of a higher and hyper-existent Power to imbue them with the ability to exist in the first place. That is why the divine light can only be “contemplated by those deemed worthy” (101). For while the man contemplating these glorious rays of divine energy has a beginning, the light does not (ironically, in more Scholastic terms, it could be said that the rays are, like God, ens a se while we are ens ab alio); hence, they are not the same in nature, and, therefore, understanding and contemplation must be a function of the divine.
Little, however, can be said of God’s essence or nature (which terms, with regard to questions of the divine ousia, are usually synonymous in post-Chalcedonian theological dialectic). Ousia, as term designated for the ontological category of the Godhead, does refer to the nature of an individual existence, but God’s existence – i.e. His own essence – transcends all these principles, which gives rise to the use of the term “Superessential Godhead” (hyperousios thearchia). The Godhead is superessential inasmuch as it transcends even those energies that are comprehensible to the human nous, as is shown in the citation from St. Maximus the Confessor (preceding paragraph). As stated earlier, the names applied to God’s energies are by no means valid depictions of His essence, even as the rays coming forth from the sun are not, for example, the essence of the sun in and of itself. “[T]his essence,” in other words, “transcends all affirmation and all negation” (98), and therein lies the very reason it cannot be named.
In conclusion, St. Palamas’ explication of God’s knowable energies and His unapproachable essence establishes the principles essential to an Orthodox understanding of not only of these specific metaphysical properties proper to the Godhead, as well as key distinctions in soteriology and apophatic versus cataphatic theological catagories. The assertion of energies as uncreated is necessary for St. Palamas’ mode of hesychastic prayer, for it is founded upon the idea that 1) deification results from a transformation of the mind and body due to an encounter with the Transcendent One; 2) there must be a part of God that is participial; 3) the nature of man remains the same, and, likewise, the nature of God remains as it is, was, and ever shall be. Firstly, to claim the essence of God is what deifies man would be to claim that the nature of man – and of God, who is, of course, above him – would change into something it could never be (i.e. to claim that God’s essence or nature were a created being). Secondly, to claim God’s essence/nature was something man could take on himself would be to degrade the divine. Thirdly, if man were unable to participate in the divine to any degree, his salvation would thereby become, for all intents and purposes, highly improbable if not functionally impossible. In fine, St. Gregory's distinction against the Barlaamites between the categories of essence and energies in the Godhead is one that proves itself not only theologically cogent, but also time-tested by the experience of the monks of the Holy Mountain as well as by the immemorial Patristic tradition as it had been received in the East.
